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Abstract
The Player project i1:1 an open-1:1ource effort providing a control interface specification

~Uld

soft:ware framework for abstracting robot hardware. This research presents five exploits that
compromise vulnerabilities in Player's command and control protocol. The attacks exploit
\veaknesses in the ARP, IP, TCP and Player protocols to compromise the confidentiall:y,
integrity, and availability of communication betvveen a Pla,yer client and server. The attacks
as1:1ume a laptop i1:1 connected in promiscuou1:1 mode to the same Ethernet hub a1:1 the client and
server in order to sniff all network traffic between them. Thi1:1 work also demonstrates that
Internet Protocol Security (IPsec) is capable of mitigating the vulnerabilities discovered in
Player's cormnand and control protocol. Experimental results show that all five exploits are
successful vvhen Player communication is unprotected but are defeated when IPsec
Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Securit:v Protocol (ESP) arc deployed together
(AH-ESP) in tran1:1port mode. A cost function is defined to 1:1ynthcsize three distinct scalar
costs (exploit success,

ere utilization, and network load) into a single scalar output that can be

used to compare the different defense protocols provided by IPsec. Results from this cost
function shovv that in a scenario >vhen exploits are likely, IPsec AH ESP is the preferred
defense protocol becau1:1c of its relatively low CPU and network overhead and ability to defeat
the exploits implemented in this research by authenticating and encrypting the tran1:1port and
application layers. Performance data reveals that for the Overo Earth embedded system
running a TI OiviAP:3i5::W processor at

720~1Hz,

IPsec AH+ESP increases CPU utilization by

0.52% and the network load by 22.9Kbps (64.:3% increase).
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VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PLAYER COMMAND AND
CONTROL PROTOCOL

I. Introduction
Remotely piloted vehicles have transformed the -vvay the C.S. military conducts
operations. The advantages of such systems to perform dull, dirty, or dangerous missions are
also being realized in the civilian sector. For these systems to consistently perform at their
maximum potential, security must be considered when designing the communication protocols
that define how these systems arc remotcl:v controlled. lf compromised, these s:vstems could
lead to the loss of confidential inf()rrnation or the loss of control of the system. In the worstcase, the cormnand and control system could be completely taken over by a malicious adversary,
which could lead to the loss of technology or life. Because of these potential consequences,
analysis of the sccurit:v of the communication protocols used to remotely pilot vehicles is vital.

Player is an open-source command and control application that provides interfaces to
remotely control and read sensor data from a mobile robot lGSVOOj. Because it is open-source
and \videl:y used in the academic realm, it is an appropriate candidate f()r studying the security
of command and control protocols of remotely piloted vehicles. Furthermore, the Player
community has not published -vvorks discussing the security of Player. thus there is a need for
work in this area.

1.1 Objectives

This thesis focuses on one part of the overall security concerns for remotely piloted
vehides: vulnerability analysis of Player's connnand and control protocol. The research goals of
this thesis are:

l) Demonstrate the vulnerability of the Player protocol to network attacks;
2) Demonstrate the effectiveness of lPsec to secure the Player protocol;
1

J) Quantify the cost of IPsec to secure the Player protocol.
It is hypothesiz:ed that vulnerabilities in Player's command and control protocol -vvill be
discovered that allow exploits to compromise communication. Additionally, it is expected that
IPsec will mitigate these vulnerabilities and allow for secure Player connnand and control.
Finally, it is hypothesized that the system will consume additional resources when employing
IPsec but that the system will maintain proper functionality.

1.2 Implications
By analyzing Pla:vcr's '.rulnerabilit:v to attack, the community is made aware of any
discovered weaknesses in the Player protocol and possible countermeasures that ensure secure
deployment. The methodology outlined in this thesis can be used to anal:yze the securit:y of
other Player-like command and control applications. Because there is concern that mobile
devices do not possess the necessary resources to protect communication, this research
determines if modern mobile devices have sufficient resources to protect Player-like command
and control with lPsec.

1. 3 Thesis Overview
Chapter 2 provides a literature revievv of network security for client-server applications
and a detailed description of the Player application. Related works in the field of performance
analysis of security protocols arc also included. Chapter 3 defines the research goals of this
thesis and the methodology used to accomplish these goals. Chapter 4 presents the results and
analysis of the data collected in this thesis. Finally, Chapter i5 concludes by summarizing the
results and significance of this work and identifying areas for fi1ture work.
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II. Literature Review
2.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a review of the foundational literature for the research detailed in
this thesis. The reader should be familiar with computer networking and the Internet stack.
The concepts described in this chapter are implemented and extended in this thesis to
accomplish the research goals.
Section 2.2 defines network security and the security model used in this thesis. Section
2.:3 provides background into the current mechanisms used to secure client-server applications.
Section 2.4 describes the Player project a.nd the protocol it uses to communicate. Section 2.5
details the architecture of the physical robotic platform selected for this research. Section 2.6
revievvs published netvvork attacks against client-server applications as well as techniques that
have been developed to mitigate these attacks. Section 2. 7 discusses the results from works
related to the field of mobile security. Section 2.8 details the nuvclt:v of this research, and
Section 2.9 provides a summary of this chapter.

2.2 Network Security Fundamentals
This section defines the term network security within the context of this thesis. The
cryptographic community often uses the variable names Alice and I3ob to represent tvvo parties
who wish to communicate securely. Because security is difficult to define without an adversary
\vith ill intent, the community uses the character, Eve (short for eavesdrop), to represent an
adversar:y who can read all messages that Alice and Bob comnmnicate to each other. The
malicious character, .M allory, is not only capable of reading all messages communicated between
Alice and Bob, but can additionally modify these messages, replay old messages, or create new
messages. This illustration casts network security as the scenario in which Alice and I3ob vvish
to communicate securely even in the presence of 1-Iallory. Figure 1 depicts an example scenario

“Hi, I’m Alice.”

“Hi, I’m Bob.”

Alice

Mallory

“Hi, I’m Alice.”

“Hi, I’m Bob.”

Bob

protocols protect client-server applications is crucial to the selection of a subset of these
defensive protocols for study in Chapter :3.

2.8.1 Client-Server Arcl1itccturc. The client-server arcl1itecture leverages cooperative
processing capabilities through the use of netvwrks to split the processing performed by the
client and the server, while still presenting a single logical service to the user. A server is a
process that exists to provide services to one or more clients [GuT95]. A client is a process that
requests and receives information hom a server. Servers do not initiate contact with clients but
instead listen for requests from clients. Once a client makes a request, the server processes and
services the request. \Vhcn the data is returned to the client, the client operates on the data
and presents it to the application, which may include a graphical user interface (GUl) for user
interaction [GuT9i5]. ::viobile client-server computing is an extension of this architecture for
mobile environments. vVhat distinguishes it from classical, fixed-connection, computing is the
fact that clients can change locations and typically have higher resource constraints [.THE991.

2.3.2 Security at the Applica..tion Layer. Pretty Good Privac.Y (PCP) provides
cryptographic confidentiality and authentication for data files and email messages [Cal07j.
Confidentiality is provided using a combination of public-key and synnnetric-ke:;,r encr:yption in
;vhich symmetric session keys are generated using public-key material. Authentication is
handled differently in PCP than in other Public Key Infrastructures (PKI). Rather than a topdown certificate authority, used in SSL, PGP uses a bottom-up ll/cb of trust model. ln this
model, users exchange and accumulate keys with other users they designate as trusted entities
[Cal07j. Keys signed by trusted entities or signed by multiple partially trusted entities arc
deemed legitimate. Keys signed by unknown entities or by a single partially trusted entity arc
not deemed legitimate. By using a decentralized approach, PGP has the advantage of being
resilient to single-node failure but scales poorly rC erOO 1-

Secure Shell (SSH) is a security protocol that creates an authenticated, encrypted
channel between two networked systems. SSH is built on a client-server architecture for which
the server is responsible for accepting or rejecting incoming connections to the host system.

1: sers run SSH client programs to authenticate with, and make requests of, the SSH server
[OpeOD]. SSH provides authentication, encryption, and integrity through a variety of encryption
algorithms, hashing algorithms, and authentication options. SSH differs from PGP in that PGP
typically secures a single file or email at a time, vvhile SSH secures an ongoing session rnSI30i"i].

Secure Soclcets Layer (SSL) was developed by

~etscape

Communication Corporation to

provide security and prilracy to Internet communication [Ilsall j. \Vhile the protocol is
application-independent, it is optimized for HTTP. SSL provides encr:vption, client-server
authentication, and message authentication codes (11AC) at the application layer. The SSL
handshake is made up of a server authentication phase and an optional client authentication
phase. The most recent implementation of SSL is Transport Layer Security (TLS), version 1.2.
TLS 1.2 adds support for the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) as well as the Secure Hash
Algorithm 2 (SHA-2) family. Rather than the bottom-up model used in PGP, SSL employs a
top-down certificate authority (CA) to authenticate clients and servers. A certificate authority
is a trusted third party that issues digital certificates that bind a name to a public-key rDie08].

2.3.3 Security at the Transport La,Yer. There are currently no widely-adopted security
protocols deployed for the transport layer of the Internet stack. Obfuscated TCP (ObsTCP) 1s
a rejected draft for the Internet Engineering Ta.':ik Force (lETF) that proposed opportunistic
encryption at the transport layer. Encryption in ObsTCP is opportunistic because if either side
docs not support 0 bsTCP, the connection falls back to normal, unencrypted TCP. ln
comparison to SSL, ObsTCP is designed to provide faster encryption without protection from a
man-in-the-middle (\UTN[) attack. Because it operates at the transport layer, any application
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layer protocol ca.n utilize ObsTCP without modification. After the IETF rejected the proposal,
the draft was removed from the lETF and development of the project ceased [Obf12j.

TcpCiypt is a reccntl:y proposed tnlllsport la:yer securit:y protocol that provides
opportunistic encryption and optional authentication. It is similar to the failed ObsTCP IETF
draJt except that it also provides hooks f(n· applications to provide authentication, ·w hich protect
against l\UTl'vi attacks. Because tcpcrypt operates in the transport layer, it has the advantage
over application la:;,rer security protocols that it can authenticate the TCP header and be used to
protect any application with less modification rnHHlO]. Tcpcrypt is currently under
development by a group of researchers at Stanford University, lead by Andrea Bit tau [Bit12j.
The lETF is currently reviewing a draft of the tcpcr:vpt protocol [BBHllj.

2.3.4 Security at tile .Network Layer. Internet rmtocol Secmity (IPsec) is a network
layer security protocol designed to mitigate many of the security weaknesses inherent to the
fnternet Protocol (IP). These vvealmesses are used in practice to perform IP spoofing, session

hijacking, man-in-the-middle (1UTl\I), and denial of service (DoS) attacks. IPsec is designed to
complement upper-layer protocols (e.g., TCP) such that they do not h<rve to be modified in
order to employ its protections. Securit:y associations (SA) are used by IPsec to define the
security parameters that allow two hosts to comnmnicate securely. A SA is uniquely identified
by an IP destination address, Security Parameter Index (SPI) . and a security protocol rKim07].

As shown in Figure 2, IPsec operates in two modes: transport and tunnel. In transport
mode, only the payload (typically a TCP segment) is protected. In tunnel mode, the entire IP
datagram is protected and encapsulated in a. ne>v IP packet. Tunnel mode is often used to
create virtual private networks (VPK).
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2.4

Player Project
This section describes the purpose and implementation of Player, the command and

control application studied in this research. Development of the experiments detailed in
Chapter ;) relies heavily on a thorough understanding of hovv Player functions and
communicates.

2.4.1 Player. The Player project is an open-source effort providing a control interface
specification

~Uld

software framework for abstracting robot hardware. The project name derives

from Shakespeare's As You Like it: "All the world's a stage, And all the men and women merely
playenf' [GSVOO]. Player provides simple and complete control over the physical sem:;ors and

actuators of a mobile agent. Player can handle virtually any number of clients allowing for a
netvvork of robots to communicate and cooperate. It is vvritten to be language and platform
independent, though client plug-ins currentl:v only exist for C++, .Java. and Python.

Player is designed a.':i a. client-server architecture in which robots running Player server
receive connnands and send status information to controlling Player clients. Robots that
participate in the cormnand and control of other robots can accomplish this by running both a
Player client and a Player server locally. An example scenario vvhere multiple Player clients
and servers arc used is shown in Figure 5 lGVSOl j. ln this scenario, Pla:ver servers (P) running
on robots

~Uld

other sensing devices send data to Player clients (C) that map, log, and

graphically display this data. Certain robots run Player clients locally, allowing them to process
data from other servers to make determinations about their surroundings.

11

Mapping Computer

0 -: :hl;.;;~~~~~:::,7
~

ooC
("'-·___-_-_-::_-.: : _.:.-:)
Data logging server

Vision system

----------------------~

------~obot ~
l__()J

Robot

Robot

GUI & Debugging workstation

Figure 5. Scenario of Networked Player Servers (P) and Clients (C) [GVS011
A Player server listens on TCP port 6665 for incoming client connections [GSVOO]. The
server provides interfaces to clients through a series of abstractions depicted in F igure 6.
Available interfaces depend on the hardware that is present in the robot and include services for
controlling two-dimensional (2D) position and robot peripherals such as sonar or grippers.
Clients subscribe to one or more of these interfaces, allowing them to issue cornrnands to and
receive d at a from the robot.

[ Your Code ]

ROBOT

T

•

[

Proxies

[

Drivers

l

Server

'I'

[

I Player
I

l
Hardware

J

Figure 6. Player Server Architecture [Owc101

2.4.2 Stage. Stage is a 2D robot simulation environment built to interface with Player
and demonstrate robot behavior. The project name is also derived from the same line in
Shakespeare's As You Like It [GSVOO]. Stage virtualizes the physical robot from Player (Figure
7) so that a Player robot can he studied in a simulated environment. It interfaces with Player
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the same way a physical rouot docs uy receiving cornuwuds and moving a simulated robot. The
si rn ula ted robot. passes sensor data. back from i t.s vi rt. ual en vi I'On men l t.o t.he Player· elien L

Figme 7. Stage Architecture IOweH>I

2.4.3 Player Network Protocol. The Player protocol defines how messages between the
dicut and server arc formatted in order to

~1c:ccss

the interfaces that Player supports.

Underst.anding the prot.oc:ol is dif'l'icult. because t.hc documerlt.at.ion on the o!Tidal website is both

outtbtcd and incomplete. The official manual states: "Todo: -More verbose documcutation

Oil

tl1 is libra.r,y; including t.he protocol" IPia.1·11. Rcca.usc tl1c prot.oc:ol details are essential t.o this
re~e~:mJr,

the following sections outline a design recovery of the

Pl~:wer

protocol uf.led in va.0.2.

2. /1.3.1 XDH. PJayor usos dw IETF !';Lnnda.rd: ExtH'IHl.J Da\.;1 Repm<'lonta.Uon

(XDTl); to encode messages that arc passed

bctwec~n

the elic11t and server. XDR is well-

documerned so underst.anding lhe encoding or a message is stra.ight.l'orward once the undcr·lying

structures have been determined. All data types an-\ encooed using

~1-byte

alignment (e.g.; 8-bit

charact.cr·s arc padded t.o fit a 4-byt.e cell) a.nd tmnsmitted in net work order (big-end ia.n)

[FreOO]. Af-l a.n exi'l.mpJe; the encoding for l.he IEEE 1'\ingJe-predsion fJoaLing point. number i1'\

pictured iu Figure 8.
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2.4.3.3 Player Message Payload. For messages that include commands or data,
Player appends a variable-length payload, which is identified in the header. These payloads are
also XDR-encoded and defined by the interface they represent (e.g., Position2D). Table 2 shows
an example payload for a Position2D command. The first six XDR cells (vx, vy, va) encode the
velocity commands as double precision floating point values. The final XDR cell (state)
specifies the motor state (on, off).

1\
I

:>,

'U

0
,..D
<ll

+'

:>,
,..D
I

00
C'1

II
t-

*""'::!'
I

~

'U

su

'U

::0
'U

I

C'1
00

0

C'1

0..

>=1

0.....-<
·+'
-

<ll

>

"[j)
0

0..

;....
<ll

I

....<ll I

~

~

::0
~
~

:>,
ell ~
........

0..

:>,
ell

::0
~
~

+'

v 0,

.S

Table 2. Example Player Command Payload
Type
Name
Value
Description
4-byte XDR cells
00 00 00 00
double
vx
0.0000 velocity on the X-axis
00 00 00 00
00 00 00 00
double
vy
0.0000 velocity on theY-axis
00 00 00 00
BF FO C1 52
double
va
-1.0272 angular velocity
38 2D 73 65
00

00

00

01

uint8 t

state

1

motor state

2.5 iRobot Create Platform
The iRobot Create is an educational robot platform designed for educators, students,
and developers [Iro11]. iRobot provides an interface specification that allows developers to send
commands to robot motors and read data from sensors onboard the Create. Player server
includes a driver that implements this interface specification. In Figure 9, a Player client
connects via WIFI to the Player server that is executed on the Overo Earth embedded system.
The server translates the client commands through the Create driver and transmits them via an
RS232 serial connection to the Create microcontroller. The Create microcontroller performs the
hardware level control and returns requested data to the Player server, which forwards it back
to the client.
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Robot Hardware
Motors, Sensors

Microcontroller

RS232
Serial
WIFI
Player Server
Player Client

Gumstix
Overo Earth
Embedded System
Angstrom Linux

iRobot Create

share encryption and decryption keys. \Jodern examples include the Data Encryption Standard
(DES) and the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). ln public-h\Y algorithms, Bob's
encryption public-key is available to all parties, but the corresponding decryption private-key is
knuwn only to Bob. Alice uses Bob's public-key to encrypt her message and only Bob can
decrypt it because he is the only one with access to the private-key [Tr\V06]. RSA is a modern
example of a public-key algorithm.

2.6.2 Attacks on Integrity. Alice and Bob wish to connnunicate while ensuring that they
are in fact communicating vvith each other (authentication) and that their messages have not
been altered (data integrit:v). :\Jallor:v can launch a class of attack called address bpoofing,
described by Heberlein and Bishop, in which 1hllory uses false lP addresses to establish forged
communication 'vith Bob [HeB96].

Another class of integrity compromise is the man-in-the-middle (\IITM) attack, in which
Alice initiates communication vvith whom she thinks is I3ob, but who is actually 1via.llory.
Mallory for..vards communication (potentially modified) to and from Alice and I3ob vvho are
unaware of \Jallory's actions. :\HTM attacks can be achiuved when :\Jallory is on Alice or Bob's
subnet using an attack called ARr cache poisoning [\VhaOl, Phi07]. In this MITM attack,
Mallory sends gratuitous ARP responses to remap Alice and Bob's IP addresses to her \IAC
address. Because of this, Alice and I3ob unlmmvingly send messages meant for each other's
l\IAC addresses to Mallory's MAC address instead.

If 1viallory is on the same Ethernet switch as Alice, she can perform another 1vUTM
attack called port stealing rorV0:3]. In this attack, \Iallory floods her mvn Ethernet port with
packets containing the \IAC address of the gateway router. \Vhen Alice sends a message to her
gatev.my router, the switch will incorrectly forward it to 1ifallory instead because the s'vitch
associates the gatev.my router's :\,fAC address with Mallory's Ethernet port.
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TCP connection llijacldng is an active 1\UT:v£ attack that exploits TCP sequence
numbers to gain control of an ongoing TCP connection [Jon95j. ln this attack, :Vfallory creates
a dcsynchroni7:ed state between Alice and Bob's sequence numbers, preventing them from
exchanging data directly. :VIallory captures the corrupt messages to maliciously modify the
application layer and then corrects the sequence nmnbers so Alice and Bob will accept the
modifications. .Joncheray proposes two methods for creating the desynchronized state, early
desynchroniza.tion and null data. desynchronization

pon9Fi1.

Early des_)rnchronbmtion is achieved

>vhen lVlallory resets Alice and I3ob's initial TCP connection and then quickly establishes a. new·
malicious connection with one of them. :'-l'ull data dcsynchroni7:a.tion involves lVIallor:v watching
an ongoing TCP connection and then injecting a large amount of null data with correctly
calculated next sequence numbers. One negative side effect of TCP connection hijacking is that
it generates an ACK storm >vhen the connection becomes flooded with desynchronized ACK
packets. The ACK storm can potentially ovenvhelm the attacker's ability to capture and
retransmit packets.

The MlT:\;1 attacks described above can be mitigated b:v authenticating the messages
Alice and Bob send to one another. Hasl1 fiwctions map a large variable-length collection of
messages into a small fixed-length set of message digests. These are typically used for error
detection. A cryptographic ha.sh function provides authentication in addition to integrity
through the usc of public-key cryptograph:v. Alice first hashes her message to produce a.
message digest, then encrypts the digest with her private-key to produce a digital signature

lBSP95j.

1\Jcss<Jgc <Hl tlwn tic<J tion codes (MAC) work similarly to cryptographic hash functions

except that rather than using public-key cryptography, Alice's message digest is encrypted with
a syrnrnetric-key she shares with Bob [KuRHla].
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I3y capturing and storing messages sent bet-vveen Alice and I3ob) l\:Iallory can launch a
third cla1:11:1 of integrity attack: the rcpla,y <Jttack. ln thi1:1 attack, :'viallory replay1:1 old messages
which she might not even be able to decipher because of encryption or modify because of
authentication protection [KuRlO]. By replaying a message, l'viallory could impersonate Alice
and compel Bob to repeat some action, resulting in negative consequences. 1;sing a timestamp,
nonce (one time use number), or sequence number as input to a. cryptographic hash function
defeats replay attacks rKuRlOa1.
2.(). 3 Attacks on A va.ilability. Alice and I3ob wish to have the ability to communicate
when needed. Iviallory can launch a clas1:1 of attacks called denial-of-service (DoS) to disrupt
Alice and Bob's abilit:v to communicate effectively.

~viallor:v

achiuves this effect by sending

messages to Bob that interfere ;vith his normal operation. Typically this means sending a vast
number of messages to overload I3ob's resources or the net>vork infrastructure that he uses to
communicate. A distributed-denial-of-sen-ice (DDoS) attack >vorks in the same way, except
l\Iallory coordinates man}'' attacking machines to amplify the re1:11llting damage l\IDil05j.

SYN flooding i1:1 a specific DoS attack in which

~via.llory

create1:1 a large amount of half

open TCP connections with Bob [Cer98]. Each time a connection is opened, Bob allocates
resources for it. Since :rvlallory never closes these connections, Bob eventually runs out of
resources to allocate for ne-vv connections coming from either ::VIallory or Alice.

SY~

cookies

mitigate SYK flooding by using particular choices of initial TCP sequence number1:1 and waiting
to commit the full amount of resources for a connection until the client has completed the TCP
handshake lBerllj.

Mallory exploits the network la:yer with Smmf <Jttacks by 1:1ending a broadcast lCMP
echo request into a. susceptible network with Bob's address as the return address [Cer98]. The
Srnurf netvwrk is used to amplify the effect by using rna.ny systems which unwittingly flood Bob
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'<vith echo replies, disrupting his infrastructure. Chau describes that the first step in defending
against Smurf attacks is to prevent one's own network from being a Smurf that is used to attack
other networks. Configure the router to block all outbound packets that indicate a source
address not contained ·w ithin the routers internal subnet. In addition, disallow incoming
broadcast IGMP packets [Cha04].

TOP connection flooding expands upon the SYN flooding attack by finishing the three;va:y TCP handshake. l\hllor:;,r floods Bob with forged TCP SYI\ packets and listens for Bob's
SY~-ACK

response. Iviallory then completes the connection b y replying v.rith an ACK using

Bob's SYN-ACK sequence number. A popular 1rersion of this attack is the HTTP-GET flood
attack [YlS07j. Because the malicious packets have legitimate TCP headers and HTTP
payloads, they are difficult to distinguish from legitimate requests and thus more difficult to
filter out effectively. Yatagai et al. propose behavioral algorithms to detect and deny malicious
requests that complete the TCP handshake [YIS07]. In another mitigation technique, client
pu?:zlcs, a server discerns a client's commitment to making a connection by utilizing some of the

client's resources. A puzzle is defined as a task that is difficult to solve b:v the client but eas:v to
verif:y by the server. Only aft.er the client returns the solved puzzle will the server allocate
resources to the connection. For this strategy to be effective, the client must always commit
more resources than the server [Al\LOl].

TCP reset allows Mallor:v to close a live connection between Alice and Bob by injecting

a spoofed TCP header into their connection with the reset bit set. \Vatson's results show that
practical attacks arc possible on the order of 10 seconds when the attacker has the capability to
transmit 4:370 packets per second [\Vat04j. To defeat TCP reset attacks, \Vatson suggests the
use of the optional TCP :VID5 header to authenticate each packet and its TCP header ;vhich
contains the reset flag. Jvialicious packets that fail the \IDfi authentication are silently dropped.
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vVatson also recommends that the TCP >vindmv size be carefully tuned in order to make it as
small as possible, while still maintaining reliable and timely communication. A smaller TCP
window size forces the attacker to expend more resources to dose the connection because the
probability that the reset. packet correctly falls into the window is reduced [\Vat04].

2.6.4 Network Attack Tools. To demonstrate exploits that compromise the Player
protocol, several cormnon networking tools are extended by this research. \Vireshark is a
network protocol anal:yzer that. allmvs a user to capture and int.eractivel:y browse computer
netvvork traffic. 13ecause it is >vrit.t.en in C/ C I I , it can be compiled on all popular operating
systems and supports a large number of protocols out of the box [\Virll j. A custom \Vireshark
dissector that parses the Player protocol described in Section 2.4.3 is created for this research
and indnded in Appendix A.

Scapy is an interactive packet manipulation program developed

a..-;

a P:ython module.

The core features it provides are the ability to capture and dissect packets and the ability to
forge and transmit packets on the >vire. Scapy is designed to handle scanning, trace routing,
probing, and network attacks. By including hooks to bind new protocols, Sca.py is extendable
b:y the user [Scall]. Because it is written in Python, Scapy code runs on all popular operating
systems and supports popular protocols. The Player protocol described in Section 2.4.:5 and the
netvvork attacks selected in Section :1.9 are implemented in Scapy.
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2. 'l Related Works
Caldera et al. extend Ketwork Simulator 2 (KS2) to measure the performance penalties
of IPsec and Internet Key Exchange (IKE) on the

~VIobile

IP protocol [CDJ'\00]. The metrics the

authors choose are netvvork throughput and delay. Caldera et al. investigate three scenarios
involving different combinationt1 of AH and ESP in transport and tunnel modet1. :Results show
that IPsec does not have a significant penalty on throughput relative to the erratic effects
introduced by the phyt1ical wireless link. Thut1 for t1yt1tems communicating wirclessly, Caldera ct
al. predict that the performance impacts of lPscc arc negligible.

Argyroudis et al. investigate the performance impacts of using strong cryptographic
protocols (SSL and IPsee) on handheld devices [A VT04]. Their platform consists of an HP
iP AQ H:lG:m with a

206\-IH~

StrongARJV[ processor and :121vm of RAJV[ running vVindmvs CE

Pocket PC 2002. Ilef-lllltf-1 t1how that both cr:vptogra.phic protocols introduce mea.'mrablc latency
but a.re realit1tically feasible for securing casual HTTP traffic. However, the authort1 usc
significantly slower hardware than is connnercially available for similar modern devices, so their
conclusions may be outdated.

Elkeela.ny et al. perform analytical studies to estimate the space and time performance
impacts of IPsec AH and ESP when operating vvith three specific cryptographic algorithms:
l\ID5, SHA-1, and 3DES lE:\JS02j. ln terms of t;pa.cc complexity, rcsultt1 t1how AH and ESP add
an additional 24 and 22 bytes respectively to each IP packet. Their results show that for a
5001\HPS machine MD5 can be performed at MOMbps, SHA-1 at 180Mbps and

:~DES

at 41\Ibps.

2.8 Research Contributions
This research extends work in the area of mobile client-server security. The literature
produced by the Pla:ycr communit:y docs not consider the sccurit:y of the syf-ltem, an oversight
this thct1is addrct1t1es. Thit1 research implcmcntt; t1evcra.l well-known network attacks against
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Player and records the results. Given that robots have clear physical consequences (e.g., safety
concerns), it is recommended that the Player community consider how the network protocol
could be designed more securely. The performance analysis cited by Argyroudis et al. in Section
2. 7 is several years old; this analysis is updated using modern technology here.

This research

not. only quantifies the cost of system resources incurred by IPsec, but also synthesizes this with
the securit:y cost a..-;sociated ·with an unprotected system. Results are supported \vith measured
experimental data, >vhich complement previous simulated and calculated >vorks cited in Section
2. 7 by Caldera et al. and Elkeelany et al.

2. 9 Literature Review Summary
This chapter provides the background in network security, security protocols for clientserver applications, the Player project, and net\vork attacks necessary to understand this
research. The methodology described in Chapter :1 builds upon the works cited in this literature
review to accomplish the research goals of this thesis.
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III. Methodology
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides the methodology for analyzing the vulnerability of Player's
command and control protocol. The experiments described in this chapter provide data to
ans>ver the research questions of this thesis. Analysis of this data is presented in Chapter 4.

Section 3.2 defines the research goals of this thesis. Section 3.3 describes the approach
for accomplishing these research goals. Section 3.4 provides the system boundaries that frame
the System Cnder Test (SUT). Section :3.5 lists the services that the SUT provides. Section ::Ui
defines the >vorkload that the SUT performs. Section :3.7 defines the metrics by \vhich the
performance of the SUT is measured. Section :3.8 defines the system and workload parameters
in fine detail so that this work can be replicated. Section :3.9 lists the factors that are expected
to affect system perf<)rmance. Section :3.10 describes the evaluation technique that is used to
test the research hypotheses. Section :3.11 provides the experimental design for this work.
Finally) Section :3.12 provides a. summary for the chapter.

3.2 Research Goals
The research goals of this thesis are threefold:

1) Demonstrate the vulnerability of the Player protocol to network attacks;
2) Demonstrate the effectiveness of IPsec to secure the Player protocol;

:3) Quantif:v the cost of lPscc to secure the Player protocol.
I3eca.use the robot is an embedded device) it is resource constrained in both computing
capabilities and energy storage. ln addition, a mobile robot uses a wireless network to
communicate, which is inhercntl:y bandwidth-limited. Supposing that lPsec can he shown to be
effective at protecting Player, the overhead it introduces could exceed the capabilities of some
robot platforms. Therefore, the cost for research goal ;) is defined as the additional computing,
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energy) andnet>vork bandwidth resources a robot running Player must expend to protect its
command and control communication with lPsec.

This research also determines the performance impact of running lPsec while under
attack. An important question to consider is which types of connnand and control exploits are
mitigated by the different IPsec protocols? \Vhat is the performance impact that different IPsec
protocols and exploits cause? At a tactical level, this research determines the performance cost
of IPsec to defeat particular exploits, as certain IPsec protocols protect different a..-;peets of the
CIA security modeL described in Section 2.2.

It is hypothesized that exploits against confidentiality, integrity, and availability vvill be

successful in compromising an unprotected Player system. Because lPsec AH authenticates the
IP payload, it will defeat attacks against integrity that attempt to inject f()rged data. IPsec
ESP will defeat attacks against confidentiality by encrypting the IP payload, making it
infeasible for an attack to read the plaintext. I3y both authenticating and encrypting the IP
payload, IPsec AH ESP will defeat attacks against both integrity and confidentiality. Ko IPsec
protocol is expected to be cffectilre against availability attacks because lPsec has no mechanism
to prevent an attacker from consuming shared network resources. "Csing IPsec willmeasurabl:y
increase the CP"C utilization, energy consumption, and network traffic of the embedded system
in the robot because of the extra computational steps needed to perform authentication and
encryption algorithms and the addition of the lPsec network headers. Of the two lPsec
protocols, AH is expected to consume fewer resources than ESP a.':i Dai finds that with the same
key size, SHA-2 consumed fewer cycles per byte than AES lDai09j. lPsec AH-ESP is expected
to consume the most resources because both the AH and ESP protocols arc applied.

Attacks targeting confidentiality are not expected to affect CPU utilization, energy
consumption, or network load, since they are completely passive. Attacks against integrity and
2,)

availability are expected to increase CPU utilization and net-vvork load because the attacker >vill
introduce additional packets into the network that will be processed.

3.3 Approach
To accomplish the aforementioned research goals, vulnerabilities in the Player protocol
that compromise confidentiality, integrity, or availability a.re identified. An exploit based on
each vulnerability is written to compromise Player communication. A repeatable set of
commands a client sends to a robot is defined for each experiment in Section

:uo.:1.

\Vhile the

client transmits these baseline commands, the s:vstem is subjected to a. specific exploit while
operating using a specific IPsec protocol. Exploits that compromise confidentiality are
successful if they correctly determine the position of the robot. An exploit that successfully
injects false position data. into the Player connection successfully compromises integrity.
Exploits that compromise availability arc successful if they terminate the connection between
the client and the robot. The performance of the system under these different conditions is
measured to

quantif~y

the effects of defense protocols and exploits.

3.4 System Boundaries
The System Under Test (SUT) in this research is the Pla;y-er Defense System (PDS).
PDS (Figure 10) consists of Alice (Player client), Bob (Pla:vcr server), \Iallory (malicious
attacker), a defense protocol, and the network over which communication occurs. Input to the
system is legitimate position commands and position data-requests from the dient (Alice) as
well a.s malicious exploits from the attacker (1lallory). Output from the system is both the
physical movement of the server (Bob) and position data packets sent in response.
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Player Defense System

Alice

Defense Protocol
(Component Under
Test)

Bob

Network

Input (Workload)

Output
Player Client

1. Position command
2. Position data request
3. Exploit

Player Server

Mallory

Attacker







1. Physical movement of Bob
2. Position data packet sent
by Bob

defense protocol. :VIallory does not attempt any brute force attacks to determine
authentication or encryption kcyf-1.



Network- The network is a communication channel that supports the coordination
of multiple end systems. It provides no confidentiality, integrity, or authentication
to the messages sent by end systems. It is a shared medium, meaning systems
contend for use of the channel and any messages can be read by all systems.



Defense Protocol- The defense protocol is the Component Under Test (GCT). It is
a t1ecurity mechanism agreed to b:v both Alice and Bob in which the:v usc a shared
secret to protect one or more principles of the CIA t1ecurity model.

\Vhile Player has been developed to support multiple client and server agents, this
research limits the scope to a single client and server to focus on analyzing the vulnerabilities in
the Player protocol. Player also supports many different robot services other than 2dimensional position, but those arc also beyond the t1cope of this research. Exploits employed
by \Iallory arc limited to the following network protocols: Player, TCP, lP, ARP, and Ethernet.
That is, l\lallory does not attempt to exploit a vulnerability in the Player application itself to
execute arbitrar:y instructions on the end systems of either Alice or Bob with an exploit such as
a buffer-overflow attack. Rather, ::VIallory exploits weaknesses in Player's netvvork protocol to
externally cause effects. This distinction is made to focus the scope of this research on Player's
network protocol '.rulnerabilitics rather than its software application vulnerabilities.

3.5

Syste~

Services

PDS provides two services: a connnand and control service and defense against exploits.
The cornrnand and control service receives an input stream of position corrnnands and position
data-requests that are transmitted from Alice to Bob. A position command is successful if Bob
moves as commanded and fails if he either docs not move or moves in a way other than
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commanded. A position data-request is successful if Bob replies '<vith a correct position data.
packet and failt> if he either doct> not reply or replies with incorrect data. Failure modes as
described above for the command and control service arc not considered part of this research as
they do not support the goals defined in Section 8.2.

The second service PDS provides is defense against exploits. Specifically, PDS protects
confidentiality, integrity, and availability. The outcome is a success if the system defeats the
exploit. The outcome is a failure, however, if the exploit is not defeated. The precise goals of
each exploit are enumerated in Section :1.10.:1.

3. 6 Workload
The workload submitted to PDS it> composed of two distinct partt>: a t>tream of
commands sent from Alice to Bob to exercise the legitimate connnand and control of Bob and
one of six exploits, launched by 1viallory, to demonstrate the defensive service of PDS. Since the
goal of this research is to study real-time command and controL the legitimate command stream
models a human pilot remotely piloting the robot. This workload it> comprit>ed of a continumm,
periodic t>trcam of commands. ln addition, t>ince a human pilot requires real-time feedback to
correctly pilot the robot , the legitimate connnand stream will also contain a certain ratio of
data-requests per commands. These >vorkload parameters are defined in Section :3.8.2.

Exploits are submitted to the system as part of the "vorkload. The six selected exploits
arc designed to emulate common network attackt> that compromise one of the principles of the
CIA security model. Each of the selected exploits demonstrates real-world impact on the
command and control of a mobile robot and is publically available. These exploits arc
enumerated in Section 3.8.2.
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System Factors

System Parameters

1. Platform
2. CPU Type
3. Memory
4. Network Interface Card
5. Operating System
6. Network Type
7. Player Version
8. Attack Tool
9. IPsec Implementation
10. Cryptographic Algorithms
11. Power Supply

Defense Protocol Used
1. None
2. IPsec AH
3. IPsec ESP
4. IPsec AH+ESP

Player Defense System
Workload Parameters
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Defense Protocol
(Component Under
Test)

Bob

Network

Metrics
Player Client

Player Server

Mallory

Workload Factors
Mallory Exploit
1. None
Eavesdropping
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3. ARP Cache Poisoning
4. TCP Connection Hijacking
Denial-of-Service
5. TCP Reset
6. TCP Connection Flooding





Attacker

1. Exploitation Outcome - Mallory
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2. CPU Utilization - Bob (% utilization)
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Exploit- Jviallory launches one of six specific attacks that each target a single
principle of the CIA security model. Each exploit is

inscparabl~y

related to its

exploitation outcome metric and can also affect Bob's CPU utilization, power
consmnption, and network load. These exploits are enumerated in Section 8.9.

3.9 Factors
Table ;) summarizes the factors and levels used in this research.

Factor
Defense Protocol
Exploit



Table :3. Factors and Levels
Levels
Konc, lPscc AH, lPscc ESP, lPscc AH+ESP
Kane, Passive Sniffing,
ARP Cache Poisoning, TCP Connection Hijacking,
TCP Reset, TCP Connection Flooding

Defense Protocol- The defense protocol is chosen as a factor bccaur:;c it is the
component under ter:;t. lt is expected to affect ail performance metricr:;. lPr:;cc is used
for the defense protocol levels because it provides confidentiality and integrity
protection for any application layer protocol vvithout the need to modify that
application. Transport mode is selected for this research because the single clientserver pair, defined in Section 3.4, resides on the same subnet with no intermediary
routers. The IPsec configuration file that defines the security associations used b:y
Alice and Bob is included in Appendix B. PGP, SSL, and SSH are exduded from
this research because they require modification to the Player application. Tcpcrypt
is also excluded because it is still a work in progress and authentication requires
modification to the Player application. The factor levels are

 :.Jane- Ko dcfeni-ic protocol is used.
 IPsec Authentication Header (AH)
protection in transport mode.

IPsec with integrity r:md authentication
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Statistics > Summary

Time
Experimental Events

Phase
Setup

[Alice,
[Alice,
[Alice,
[Bob]
[Alice]
[Alice,

Steady State

[Alice, Bob]

Player Client/Sever Begin Sending
Command/Data Loop

[Mallory]

Executes Exploit

Bob, Mallory] Powered On
Bob, Mallory] Booted
Bob] IPsec Security Associations Loaded
Player Server Launched
Player Client Launched
Bob] Player Client Connects to Server

Attack
Simultaneous

Data Collection Events
[Pow Mon] LabVIEW VI Launched
[Net Mon] Wireshark Launched

[Bob]
Begins sysstat Log
[Pow Mon] Begins LabVIEW VI Log
[Net Mon] Begins Wireshark Capture

80 seconds

[Alice, Bob] Security Compromised
(if exploit success)

Conclusion
Simultaneous

[Bob]
Ends sysstat
[Pow Mon] Ends LabVIEW Virtual Instrument
[Net Mon] Ends Wireshark Capture

from pilot study data requires 70-75s to successfully overwhelm 13ob in this experimental
configuration.

After 80 1-leconds has pasi-ied, the Conclusion phase is entered and all data collection is
halted. Sysstat., LabVIE\V, and \Vireshark are configured to halt automatically after the
allotted time. Exploit. success is determined in three ways based upon which CIA security
model principle is targeted. \Vhen targeting confidentiality, the exploit. is successfi1l if ::viallory's
console prints out the correct position data (px=Om, py=Orn, pa=Orn). \Vhen targeting
integrity, the exploit is successful if Alice's console prints out incorrect position data (anything
other than px=Om, py=Om, pa=Om). \Vhen targeting availability, the exploit is succei-ii-iful if
the connection between Alice and Bob is terminated during the Attack phai-ie.

3.10.4 Validation Strategy. Stage v4.0.1, a Player simulator described in Section 2.4.2, is
used to validate Player responses and robot behavior of the PDS under the baseline workload.
Performance results are compared >vith other related works to validate system response

[CD~OO,

EiviS02, AVT041. \Vhile the results are not expected to match exactly, there should be a
correlation between the results obi-ierved in the SUT and thme published in the academic
literature. Section

4.:3.:~

validates this research by comparing experimental results with these

related \Vorks.

3.11 Experimental Design

To measure the rclationshipi-i between ail of the factors listed in Section 3.9, a full
factorial design is selected. A total of two factors are chosen \vith 4 and {) levels each. A full
factorial design requires 4 x 6 = 24 unique experiments. The statistical confidence level is
lt is expected that no more than G repetitions will be required for a total of G x 24 = 120

experirnen ts.
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3.12 Methodology Summary
This chapter defined the methodology to 1) Demonstrate the vulnerability of the Player
protocol to network attack, 2) Demonstrate the effectiveness of IPsec to secure the Player
protocoL and ;)) Quantify the cost of IPsec to secure the Player protocol. The Player Defense
Syt1tem (PDS) provides both legitimate command and control services for a Player robot as well
as defense against exploits that compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the
system. The components, performance mctricf-1, system and workload parameters, a.nd factors
for this research arc abo defined. The evaluation technique and experimental design arc
described to allow the experiments herein to be reproduced.
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IV. Analysis and Results

4 .1 Chapter Overview
This chapter presents an analysis of the data collected from the experiments defined in
Chapter 3. Analyt>is of the data satisfies research goals 1 and 2, defined in Section :3.2, b:y
demonstrating the vulnerabilities of Player and the effectiveness of lPt>ec. A cost function it>
defined to satit>fy ret>earch goal 3 by quantifying the cost of lPt>ec to secure the Player protocol.

The power consumption metric, detailed in Section 3. 7, is excluded from analysis in thit>
chapter for several reasons. Because a wired network is selected, the CPU of the embedded
system is the onl:y predominant power consuming device. Since the power consumption of the
CPU is directly related to its utilization, pmver consumption is a redundant metric for this
experimental configuration lTexllj. The power consumption data it> none-the-less included in
Appendix F to aid future research in this area but is not discut>t>ed in this chapter. Chapter 5
provides suggestions for fi1ture work related to power analysis.

Section 4.2 describes a cost function to analyze the performance tradeoHs associated with
employing IPsec with respect to CPU utilization, netvvork load, and defensive capability.
Section 4.:1 inputs the data collected in this research into the cost function to determine the cost
of employing each dcfent>e protocol under a t>pecific scenario. Section 4.4 computet> the cost
function with respect to t\vo additional scenarios to demonstrate the effect of scenario
parameters on cost output. Section 4.5 applies the results from this research to the broader
scope of securing Internet client-server communication. Section 4.6 provides a. summary of the
analysis and results.

4.2 Cost Function
The cost function defined in this section synthesizes three distinct. scalar costs (exploit
success, CPC utilization, and network load) measured in this research into a single scalar output
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that every exploit succeeds >vhen no defense protocol is used. This is because neither the TCP
header nor Player payload arc authenticated or encrypted. TCP connection hijacking has a
succesf-1 rate of only 80% because of the large amount of traffic (ACK storm) it generates during
the attack. It. is hypothesized that Alice occasionally does not correctly receive f(>rged Player
data either because l'viallory's exploit is overwhelmed and becomes unresponsive, or the excessive
ACK storm packets collide \vith the forged packets on the Ethernet hub.

The exploitation ::mccess data (Table 8) also satisfies research goal 2 by demonstrating

that IPsec is able to protect the Player protocol. Passive sniffing is successful against IPsec AH
because lVIallory is able to dit1t1ect the unencrypted Pla:vcr pa:doad. lPt1ec AH defeats all other
exploitf-1 because it authenticates the TCP header and Player payload. lPsec ESP defeats all of
the tested exploits because Scapy is unable to dissect. the encrypted TCP header and Player

payload. Hovvever, it should be noted that it is conceivable that attacks against IPsec ESP in
encrypt-only mode, similar to those Paterson and Y au demonstrate, could be used against
Player [PaY06j. For example, toggling the TCP reset flag of encrypted Player packetf-1 could
lead to a t1m:cessful TCP reset attack. So while lPsec ESP defeats integrity exploits described in
Section

:~.9,

it does not ensure integrity protection in encr:ypt-only mode. IPsec AH-ESP

defeats all exploits described in Section :3.9 because it both authenticates and encrypts the
transport and application layers. The attacks implemented in this research are infeasible
against lPscc AH-ESP.
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ce

ne

nmax

nmax

sho-vvs the average measured packet

si~e

for the data collected in this research. These values are

calculated by dividing the total network load in b:ytes by the number of packets transmitted
(Appendix F). lPsec AH increases the measured packet size by the expected 24 b:ytes.
Elkeelany et al. also conclude that IPsec ESP increases the packet size by 22 bytes due to 10
bytes of fixed header and 12 bytes of ICV. The authors note that ESP may use additional
padding (up to 25i5 bytes), depending on the selected encryption algorithm. Table 11 shows the
average measured packet she (in bytes) for this research increased by
ESP.

~ote

:w bytes as

a result of

that ESP is not configured to use optional authentication (i.e., no ICV is appended)

in these experiments, so the expected overhead of ESP is 10 b:vtes of fixed header plus
encryption padding. In this research the encryption algorithm, AES-2i56, is responsible f()r 26
b:ytes of additional padding on average. The IPsec AH+ESP network load reported in Section
4.:3.2 is validated because its overhead is the expected sum of both AH and ESP: 24 bytes I :36
bytes

GO bytes.

Table 11. Average :'dcasurcd Packet Size (b:vtes)

Factor Level
None
Overhead

None

IPsec AH

IPsec ESP

IPsec AH+ESP

94

118

uo

li'i4

0

24

:36

60

Results from Argyroudis ct. al. validate the CPU mctrics gathered in this research
[AVT04j. The authors find that the network security protocols, SSL and lPscc, do not
significantly impact real-time comnmnication on mobile devices. An older HP iP AQ H:36:30 ;vith
a

206\JH~

StrongAR:VI processor and :121vm RA::VI is tested in their research. Their system has

significantly less resources than the embedded system (Bob) specified in Section ;) .8. As a
result, it is expected that the SUT's CPU resources in this research are affected even less by
lPsec. The measured CPC utilization (Table 9) confirms that the CPU overhead is relatively
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Thm;, for the Likely Exploit Scenario, IPse<: AH ESP would be the preferred defense protocol
given its small additional cost over IPsec ESP and the security benefits authentication provides.
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Figure 14. 9.1'){ Confidence Interval: Likely Exploit Scenmio

4·4 Scenario Exploration
Section

L~.~

applies the data gathered from this research to the cost function developed in

Section 4.2 using a particular set of scenario parameters defined as the Likely Exploit Scenmio.
This section demonstrates the importance of selecting appropriate scenmio pammeters by
computing the cost function using the same measured data hnt: with different 1-;cena.rio
parameters. The cost results for each additional scenmio me compared with the Likely Exploit
Scenario.

1.1.1

Confld~mti;~lity

Free Scem1rio. The Confidentiality Free Scenario i1-; a small

deviation from the Likely Exploit Scenario in which the cost of losing confidentiality (sC) is set
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4.5 Application of Results
This section frames the results of this research within the wider context of network
security. Results support the ease for authentication and encryption by default due to modern

harchvare advances.

Additionally~

this research highlights the trend that as a Player system is

scaled to include additional hosts, it is expected that the network overhead introduced b:y lPsec
>vill become more consequential than the CPC overhead.

Finally~

results from this research

highlights potential weaknesses in the abilit:v of application layer security protocols (e.g., SSL)
to protect against DoS attacks that target the TCP connection and supports the adoption of
transport layer protocols (e.g., tcperypt) to mitigate these weaknesses.

4. 5.1 The Case

f()r

Authentication a11d Encr:yption b_y Defa11lt. This research supports

the findings of Caldera et al. and Argyroudis et al. that IPsec can be used to protect nehvork
traffic of embedded devices with an acceptable cost to CPU utilization lCD:.JOO, AVT04j. Kote
that Section 3.8.1 specifics that SHA-256 and AES-256 were used as the cryptographic
algorithms. Both algorithms are highly regarded as secure by the cryptographic cormnunity.
The selected key sizes make brute force attacks against them infeasible toda:y and represent the

highest computational cost an embedded device is likely to encounter. Analysis of the measured
CPU utilization (Table 9) finds that when no exploit is used, the CPC cost to run lPscc
AH-ESP is only 0.52% utilization higher than without a. defense protocol. As embedded
devices continue to become more powerful, the relative CPU overhead of authentication and

encryption algorithms >vill naturally continue to diminish.

This research also demonstrates the lmv resources needed to exploit an unprotected
protocol running over TCP/IP. Section ;) .8.1 details the hardware specifications for \Iallory: a

laptop released in 2007 running an open-source tool, Scapy. The TCP /IP attacks implemented
against Player for this research arc publically available and any application layer protocol that

G4

does not employ some form of strong authentication and encryption is therefore assumed to be
equally vulnerable. Because advancements in hardware allow more devices to be capable of
authentication and encryption

~Uld

the difficulty in attacking TCP/lP communication is

decreasing, authentication and encryption should become the default. rather than the exception
for network protocol design.

4.5.2 Scaling: CrU vs . .Nehvork Overhead. Performance analysis data collected for a
single client-server pair running Player can be used to estimate the effects of scaling on system
performance. Consider that the number of independent client-server pairs is increased and that
each pair that is added to the s:vstcm consists of another two devices with the same parameters
as the client (Alice) and server (Bob), detailed in Section 3.8. Independent client-server pairs
transmit. over a shared medium but only comnmnicate behveen pairs. Assume that each pair
independently generates the same vvorkload of Player messages tested in this research. Also,
assume that lVlallory does not launch exploits. .\l"ote that precise analysis of this problem -vvould
require network simulation or experimentation, but an estimation of trends is still possible with
the data gathered in this research.

Each client-server pair added to the system introduces additional CPU resources that
can be used to perform the authentication and encryption algorithms necessary for IPsec to
protect communication. Since each client-server pair is independent in its communication, it is
estimated that the CPC overhead with respect to lPsec will not increase. ln contrast, each
client-server pair added to the system docs not introduce additional network resources. Since
each additional client-server pair consumes additional network resources, the network overhead
of lPscc becomes significant.
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Figure 17. Client-Server Pairs vs. Average Packet Size
As the average packet size for an applicMion increases, the aven1ge

overhe~1d

introduced

by IPscc AH ESP (GO bytes) becomes iusiguificaut. For example, an application with au
average packet size of L)OO bytes (the maximum

transmi~~ion

unit of Ethernet) would incur an

estimated average packet size increase of only 4c){ running T.Psec i\H I ESP. As a result, it is
expected that the system would ouly lose au estimated 4c){ of the maximum supported pairs.
ln summary,
overhead:

i~

re~nlt~

predict that when scaled indepenrlently, network overhearl, not CPU

the limiting factor. ln addition, the

~maller

the average packet 1-iille of an

application is, the higher the relative network overhead of IPscc.

·1.<1.3

lnterm~t

Client-Server Applications. The Player protocol 1-itnrlierl in this refoiearch is

only one of many application layer protocols that rnn over TCP / lP. However, the
vulnerabilities that nrc demonstrated can be applied to a wider set of protocols. Any TCP /IP
protocol that

doe~

not employ some form of 1-itrong authentication and encryption is potentially

vulnerable to the exploits implemented in

thi~

research. This

re~earch

reveals that emberlrlerl

devices nrc at least as vulnerable as desktop systems with respect to the network

st~1ck

when

they communicate using the same insecure protocols. In some -vvays, embedded devices are more
vulnerable as demonstrated by the TCP connection flooding DoS attack. Embedded devices,
such as Player robots, acting as servers t:ypically possess fewer computing

~Uld

memory resources

and thus can be overwhelmed more easily.

SSL is the de facto protocol to provide process-to-process security over the Internet f(n·
client-server applications. Two of the exploits demonstrated in this research, TCP connection
hijacking and TCP reset , compromise weaknesses in the TCP protocol. These weaknesses arise
because the TCP header is not authenticated, allowing 1viallory to modify information related to
the TCP connection without Alice or Bob's knowledge. Because SSL is an application layer
protocoL it is not able to authenticate the TCP header, making it vulnerable to DoS attacks
that target the TCP connection. \Vatson demonstrates that TCP reset can be used to attack a
TCP / IP protocol that does not authenticate the TCP header rvVat041. Another disadvantage of

SSL is that applications must be modified to support SSL, adding complexity and development
cost to these Internet applications.

lPsec is able to authenticate the TCP header, defeating the TCP DoS attacks described
in the preceding paragraph, but it provides only machine-to-machine, rather than process-toprocess, security. The disadvantage is that IPsec cannot authenticate users, only machines. For
example, IPsec cannot distinguish bet>veen multiple Player clients on the same machine. In
addition. lPsec docs not interoperate uvcr Network Address Translation (:'-l'AT) which is a
popular technique used to extend 1Pv4 addresses. NAT could be needed in a mobile
environment when Player is actually deployed with 1Pv4.

Tcpcrypt, described in Section 2.:3.:3, mitigates many of the disadvantages that SSL and
IPsec possess. It. provides authentication to the TCP header, protection to any application layer
protocol, and process-to-process security. By authenticating the sequence number, shown in
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Figure 18) tcpcrypt defeats TCP connection hijacking) and by authenticating the flags, tcpcrypt
defeats TCP reset. Because tcpcrypt operates in the transport layer, it requires less
modification to applications than SSL. Tcpcrypt also intcroperatcs with KAT, allowing Player
to utilize this technology if needed. Theref(>re because of these advantages, tcpcrypt deserves
attention from the security community &s a mechanism to provide more protection to TCP/ IP
applications than is currently available.
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4. 6 Analysis and Results Summary
This chapter

analy~es

the results of the experiments defined in Chapter :1 to accomplish

the research goals of this thesis. A cost function is defined to quantify the performance and
security cost associated with running a defense protocol for protection against exploitation.
lVIcasurcd data is input to the cost function to determine the defense protocol with least cost.

"C ruler the Likel:y Exploit Scenario, IPsec AH-ESP is found to be the preferred defense protocol
because of its relatively lovv CPU and network performance costs and its ability to defeat all the
exploits implemented in this research. Tvvo additional scenarios are explored to demonstrate the
flexibility of the cost function for different usc-cases. Results support the case for
authentication and encryption of TCP/ IP cornnmnication by default and highlight potential
challenges of using lPsec for systems that must scale to many hosts sending small packets. This
research identifies tcpcrypt &s a security protocol of interest f(>r client-server applications that
communicate over TCP / IP because of its unique ability to avoid some of the disadvantages
associated -vvith IPsec and SSL.

G9

V. Conclusions and Recommendations
5.1 Thesis Summary
The following three research goals are presented in Chapter :3 and accomplished in the
analysis provided in Chapter 4.

1) Demonstrate the vulncrabili ty of the Player protocol to network attacks.

This thesis demonstrates that the Player protocol is vulnerable to attacks on all three
principles of the ClA security model. Results show that an attacker can e<.rvesdrop on position
data. sent from the robot (Pla:ver server) to the command station (Pla:ver client). ln addition,
Player is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks that allow an attacker to violate the integrity
of the position data sent from the robot to the command station. Finall:y, this research
demonstrates that Player is vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks that compromise the
availability of the command station to command and control the robot.

2) Demonstrate the cffectilreness of lPsec to secure the Player protocol.

Experimental results demonstrate that lPsec AH is capable of securing Player against
the attacks against integrity, and availability implemented in this thesis. IPsec ESP ·with no
optional authentication defeated attacks against confidentiality, integrity. and availability but is
not recommended clue to published vulnerabilities of its ovvn [13el96, PaY06]. Results shmv that
lPsec AH+ESP provides the highest level of security because it defeats all of the exploits
implemented in this research and has no published weaknesses.

:3) Quantif}r the cost of lPsec to secure the Player protocol.
l\Ietrics gathered from this research show that mobile devices arc well equipped to secure
Player-like connnand and control cmmnunication with IPsec. IPsec AH-ESP increased the
CPU utilization by just O.i52% and the network load by 22. 9Kbps (64. ;)% increa..se) . Results
70

from the cost function, defined in Section 4.2, show that for the Likely Exploit Scenario) IPsec
AH-ESP is the preferred defense protocol because of its abilit:y to defeat exploits and relatively
low overhead. For the Confidentiality Free Scenario, lPsec AH is found to be the optimal
defense protocol because it defeats integrity and availability exploits implemented in this
research. Finally, in the Unlikely Exploit Scenario, using no defense protocol results in the
lmvest cost because the probability of attack in this scenario is miniscule. The low probability
of attack causes the overhead of IPsec in the cost function to become significant.

vVhen results are applied to the wider field of net>vork security, three areas are
highlighted. First. this research demonstrates the low capabilities needed for an attacker to
compromise an unprotected protocol running over TCP /lP and that modern mobile devices arc
easily capable of authenticating and encr}1)ting nehvork connnunication. As a result, this
research supports that authentication and encr,yption become the default rather than the
exception for network communication of mobile devices. Second, this research finds that the
network uvcrhead, not CPU uvcrhead, of lPscc is expected to be a limiting factor when the
system is scaled. Because Pla:vcr communicates with a low average packet size the network
overhead of IPsec is relatively large (6:).8% increase compared to no defense protocol). Finall:y,
the TCP denial-of-service attacks implemented in this research are expected to be effective
against SSL because it cannot authenticate the TCP header. Tcpcrypt is identified as a
protocol of interest that defeats such attacks while ctvoiding some of the disadvantages
a..-;sociated ·with SSL and IPsec.

5.2 Recommendations for Future Research
This section describes future research to extend this thesis.



Performance analysis using a wireless network would be beneficial as this is likely
ho-vv a. Player system would be actually deployed. A wireless environment would
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make such a fundamental change feasible. This shift would significantly reduce the ability for
malicious uscrf-1 to perform network attacks.

#ifdef HAVE_CONFIG_H
# include "config.h"
#endif
#include <epan/packet.h>
/*********** Player Defines **************************/
/***** Message Type Defines ******/
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA 1
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD 2
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ 3
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK 4
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_SYNCH 5
#define PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_NACK 6
/***** Device Interface Defines ******/
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE 1
#define PLAYER_POWER_CODE 2
#define PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE 3
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE 4
/*** Player Device Interface Subtypes ***/
/* Defined in libplayerinterface\player_interfaces.h */
/** Player:Request Subtypes **/
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEVLIST 1
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DRIVERINFO 2
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV 3
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATA 4
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATAMODE 5
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_AUTH 7
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_NAMESERVICE 8
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_ADD_REPLACE_RULE 10
/** Player:Synch Subtypes **/
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OK 1
#define PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OVERFLOW 2
/** Payload Player:Request:Datamode **/
#define PLAYER_DATAMODE_PUSH 1
#define PLAYER_DATAMODE_PULL 2

/*** Position2d Device Interface Subtypes ***/

/*** Position2d:Request Subtypes ***/
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_GET_GEOM 1
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_MOTOR_POWER 2
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_VELOCITY_MODE 3
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_MODE 4
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SET_ODOM 5
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_RESET_ODOM 6
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PID 7
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_PID 8
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PROF 9
/** Position2d:Data Subtypes ***/
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_STATE 1
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_GEOM 2
/** Position2d:Command Subtypes */
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL 1
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_POS 2
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_CAR 3
#define PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL_HEAD 4
/*********** Player Defines **************************/

#define PLAYER_PORT 6665
static int proto_player = -1;
/* hf_* variables are used to hold the Wireshark IDs of
* our header fields; they are filled out when we call
* proto_register_field_array() in proto_register_player()
*/
static int hf_player_header = -1;
static int hf_player_header_host = -1;
static int hf_player_header_robot = -1;
static int hf_player_header_interface = -1;
static int hf_player_header_index = -1;
static int hf_player_header_type = -1;
static int hf_player_header_subtype = -1;
static int hf_player_header_subtype_player_req = -1;
static int hf_player_header_subtype_player_synch = -1;
static int hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_req = -1;
static int hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_data = -1;
static int hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_cmd = -1;
static int hf_player_header_timestamp = -1;

static int hf_player_header_sequencenumber = -1;
static int hf_player_header_payloadsize = -1;
static int hf_player_payload = -1;
/* Payload Player:Request:Datamode */
static int hf_player_payload_player_datamode = -1;
/* Payload Player:ResponseAck:Device */
static int hf_player_payload_player_respack_device_name = -1;
/* payload_position2d_data (also includes payload_position2d_cmd_vel */
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_data_px = -1;
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_data_py = -1;
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_data_pa = -1;
/* payload_position2d_cmd_vel */
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx = -1;
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy = -1;
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va = -1;
static int hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate = -1;
/* IDs
static
static
static

of the subtrees that may be created */
int ett_player = -1;
int ett_player_header = -1;
int ett_player_payload = -1;

/* Enumeration Labels */
static const value_string header_interface_names[] =
{
{PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE, "Player"},
{PLAYER_POWER_CODE, "Power"},
{PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE, "Gripper"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE, "Position2D"},
{0, NULL}
};
static const value_string header_messagetype_names[]=
{
{PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA, "Data"},
{PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD, "Command"},
{PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ, "Request"},
{PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK, "Response-Ack"},
{PLAYER_MSGTYPE_SYNCH, "Synch"},
{PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_NACK, "Response-NegAck"},

{0, NULL}
};
/******** PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE Device Interface Subtypes **********/
/**** Player:Request, Subtypes ****/
static const value_string header_subtype_player_req_names[]=
{
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEVLIST, "Device List"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DRIVERINFO, "Driver Info"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV, "Device"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATA, "Data"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATAMODE, "Datamode"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_AUTH, "Auth"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_NAMESERVICE, "Nameservice"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_ADD_REPLACE_RULE, "Add/Replace Rule"},
{0, NULL}
};
/**** Player:Synch, Subtypes ****/
static const value_string header_subtype_player_synch_names[]=
{
{PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OK, "OK"},
{PLAYER_PLAYER_SYNCH_OVERFLOW, "Overflow"},
{0, NULL}
};
/******** PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE Device Interface Subtypes **********/
/**** Position2D:Request, Subtypes ****/
static const value_string header_subtype_position2d_req_names[]=
{
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_GET_GEOM, "Get Geometry"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_MOTOR_POWER, "Motor Power"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_VELOCITY_MODE, "Velocity Mode"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_MODE, "Position Mode"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SET_ODOM, "Set Odom"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_RESET_ODOM, "Reset Odom"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PID, "Speed PID"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_POSITION_PID, "Position PID"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_REQ_SPEED_PROF, "Speed Profile"},
{0, NULL}
};
/**** Position2D:Data, Subtypes ****/
static const value_string header_subtype_position2d_data_names[]=
{
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_STATE, "State"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_DATA_GEOM, "Geometry"},

{0, NULL}
};
/**** Position2D:Command, Subtypes ****/
static const value_string header_subtype_position2d_cmd_names[]=
{
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL, "Velocity"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_POS, "Position"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_CAR, "Car-like"},
{PLAYER_POSITION2D_CMD_VEL_HEAD, "Heading"},
{0, NULL}
};
/*************** PAYLOAD Enumeration Labels *****************************/
/* Player:Request:Datamode */
static const value_string payload_player_datamode_names[]=
{
{PLAYER_DATAMODE_PUSH, "Push"},
{PLAYER_DATAMODE_PULL, "Pull"},
{0, NULL}
};
/* Dissector function for the Player Protocol */
/* The Dissector is called in two different cases, one to get a
summary of the packet (tree==NULL), and one to get details of the packet */
/* tvb: buffer to hold packet data
pinfo: contains general info about the protocol
tree: detailed dissection */
static void dissect_player(tvbuff_t *tvb, packet_info *pinfo, proto_tree *tree)
{
/* Offset tracks the location of the current item added to the tree */
gint offset = 0;
guint
guint
guint
guint

device_interface = 0;
message_type = 0;
message_subtype = 0;
payload_size = 0;

/* Set column text to protocol name */
col_set_str(pinfo->cinfo, COL_PROTOCOL, "PLAYER");
/* Clear out stuff in the info column */
col_clear(pinfo->cinfo,COL_INFO);
/* Update the info column with header information */
device_interface = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 8);
/* Defined in tvbuff.h */

message_type = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 16);
message_subtype = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 20);
payload_size = tvb_get_ntohl(tvb, 36);
col_add_fstr(pinfo->cinfo, COL_INFO, "Inter: %s, Type: %s, Payload Len: %d",
val_to_str(device_interface, header_interface_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"),
val_to_str(message_type, header_messagetype_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"),
payload_size
);
/* When tree != NULL, this is main asking for details of the packet */
if(tree != NULL)
{
proto_item *player_item = NULL;
proto_item *player_header_item = NULL;
proto_item *player_payload_item = NULL;
proto_tree *player_tree = NULL;
proto_tree *player_header_tree = NULL;
proto_tree *player_payload_tree = NULL;
/* Add a new tree node, label with Player protocol, tvb=data, consume */
/* from beginning (0) to end (-1). */
player_item = proto_tree_add_item(tree, proto_player, tvb, 0, -1, FALSE);
/* Add a Player subtree to the new Tree Node */
player_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(player_item, ett_player);
/* Add a Header subtree to the Player Tree */
/* Headers are 40bytes long */
player_header_item = proto_tree_add_item(player_tree, hf_player_header, tvb, offset, 40, FALSE);
player_header_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(player_header_item, ett_player_header);
/* Add Header items */
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree,
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree,
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree,
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree,
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree,
offset+=4;

hf_player_header_host, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
hf_player_header_robot, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
hf_player_header_interface, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
hf_player_header_type, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);

/* The Header Message Subtype is defined based on the Device Interface and Message Type*/
/* of that packet */

switch(device_interface)
{
case PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE:
switch(message_type)
{
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ:
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_player_req, tvb, offset,
4, FALSE);
break;
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_SYNCH:
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_player_synch, tvb,
offset, 4, FALSE);
break;
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK: /* Uses same subtypes as Request Message Type */
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_player_req, tvb, offset,
4, FALSE);
break;
default: /* Use generic subtype */
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
break;
}
break;
case PLAYER_POWER_CODE:
break;
case PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE:
break;
case PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE:
switch(message_type)
{
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ:
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_req, tvb,
offset, 4, FALSE);
break;
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA:
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_data, tvb,
offset, 4, FALSE);
break;
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD:
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_cmd, tvb,
offset, 4, FALSE);
break;
default: /* Use generic subtype */

proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
break;
}
break;
default: /* If device interface is other than one defined above, display generic version */
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_subtype, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
break;
}
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_timestamp, tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8; /* Double = 8 bytes */
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_sequencenumber, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_header_tree, hf_player_header_payloadsize, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
/* Add text summary for dissection window */
proto_item_append_text(player_item, ", Inter: %s, Type: %s, Payload Len: %d",
val_to_str(device_interface, header_interface_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"),
val_to_str(message_type, header_messagetype_names, "Unknown (0x%02x)"),
payload_size
);
/* If a Payload is present, add a Payload subtree to the Player Tree */
/* The Payload comprises whatever data (if any) is present after the 40 byte header */
if(tvb_length(tvb) > 40) /* Defined in tvbuff.h */
{
player_payload_item = proto_tree_add_item(player_tree, hf_player_payload, tvb, 40, -1, FALSE);
player_payload_tree = proto_item_add_subtree(player_payload_item, ett_player_payload);

switch(device_interface)
{
case PLAYER_PLAYER_CODE:
switch(message_type)
{
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_REQ:
switch(message_subtype)
{
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEVLIST:
break;
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DRIVERINFO:
break;

case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV: /* Uses similar data format to header */
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_host, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_robot, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_interface, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
break;
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATA:
break;
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DATAMODE:
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_payload_player_datamode, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
break;
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_AUTH:
break;
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_NAMESERVICE:
break;
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_ADD_REPLACE_RULE:
break;
}
break;
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_RESP_ACK:

switch(message_subtype)
{
case PLAYER_PLAYER_REQ_DEV:

/* Uses similar data format to header

*/
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_host, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_robot, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_interface, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_header_index, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_payload_player_respack_device_name, tvb, offset, -1, FALSE);
/* offset+=4;
device name */
break;
}
break;
}
break;
case PLAYER_POWER_CODE:
break;
case PLAYER_GRIPPER_CODE:
break;
case PLAYER_POSITION2D_CODE:
switch(message_type)
{
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_DATA:

Rest of payload is a string containing the

/* Payload: player_position2d_data */
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_data_px,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_data_py,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_data_pa,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
break;
case PLAYER_MSGTYPE_CMD:
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree, hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va,
tvb, offset, 8, FALSE);
offset+=8;
proto_tree_add_item(player_payload_tree,
hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate, tvb, offset, 4, FALSE);
offset+=4;
break;
}
break;
}
}
}
}

/* Registers the protocol with Wireshark */
void proto_register_player(void)
{
/* A header field is something you can search/filter on.
*
* We create a structure to register our fields. It consists of an
* array of hf_register_info structures, each of which are of the format
* {&(field id), {name, abbrev, type, display, strings, bitmask, blurb, HFILL}}.
*/
static hf_register_info hf[] =
{
/* HEADER SECTION */
/* FT_* defined in ftypes.h */
{
&hf_player_header,
{
"Header", "player.header",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, "Player Header", HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_payload,
{
"Payload", "player.payload",
FT_NONE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, "Player Payload", HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_host,
{
"Device Host", "player.devicehost",
FT_IPv4, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_robot,
{
"Device Robot", "player.devicerobot",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL

}
},
{
&hf_player_header_interface,
{
"Device Interface", "player.interface",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
header_interface_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_index,
{
"Device Index", "player.index",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_type,
{
"Type", "player.type",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
header_messagetype_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{ /* Need to create multiple messagesubtype definitions. Each Device Interface */
/* Defines its own message subtypes for each message type defines */
&hf_player_header_subtype, /* Generic message subtype def */
{
"Subtype", "player.subtype",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_subtype_player_req,
{
"Subtype", "player.subtype.player.req",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
header_subtype_player_req_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_subtype_player_synch,

{
"Subtype", "player.subtype.player.synch",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
header_subtype_player_synch_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_req,
{
"Subtype", "player.subtype.position2d.req",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
header_subtype_position2d_req_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_data,
{
"Subtype", "player.subtype.position2d.data",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
header_subtype_position2d_data_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_subtype_position2d_cmd,
{
"Subtype", "player.subtype.position2d.cmd",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
header_subtype_position2d_cmd_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_timestamp,
{
"Timestamp", "player.timestamp",
FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_header_sequencenumber,
{
"Sequence Number", "player.sequencenumber",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}

},
{
&hf_player_header_payloadsize,
{
"Payload Size", "player.payloadsize",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},

/*********************** PAYLOAD SECTION **********************************************/
/****** Player:Request:Datamode ********/
{
&hf_player_payload_player_datamode,
{
"Data Mode", "player.payload.player.datamode",
FT_UINT32, BASE_NONE,
payload_player_datamode_names, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
/****** Player:Response-Ack:Device ********/
{
&hf_player_payload_player_respack_device_name,
{
"Name", "player.payload.player.respack.device.name",
FT_STRINGZ, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
/******************** DATA TYPE SECTION **********************/
/* Position2d: player_position2d_data */
{
&hf_player_payload_position2d_data_px,
{
"PositionX (m)", "player.payload.position2d_data.px",
FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_payload_position2d_data_py,
{

"PositionY (m)", "player.payload.position2d_data.py",
FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_payload_position2d_data_pa,
{
"PositionA (rad)", "player.payload.position2d_data.pa",
FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},

/********************* CMD TYPE SECTION **********************/
/* Position2d: player_position2d_cmd_vel */
{
&hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vx,
{
"VelocityX (m/s)", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.vx",
FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_vy,
{
"VelocityY (m/s)", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.vy",
FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_va,
{
"VelocityA (rad/s)", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.va",
FT_DOUBLE, BASE_NONE,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
},
{
&hf_player_payload_position2d_cmd_vel_motorstate,
{

"Motor State", "player.payload.position2d_cmd_vel.motorstate",
FT_UINT32, BASE_DEC,
NULL, 0x0, NULL, HFILL
}
}

};
/* Setup protocol subtree array */
static gint *ett[] =
{
&ett_player,
&ett_player_header,
&ett_player_payload
};
/* Registers protocol. Format: (Name, Short Name, Abbrev) */
proto_player = proto_register_protocol ("Player Protocol", "Player", "player");
proto_register_field_array(proto_player, hf, array_length(hf));
proto_register_subtree_array(ett, array_length(ett));
}
/* Creates a dissector handle for main program to call */
void proto_reg_handoff_player(void)
{
static dissector_handle_t player_handle;
/* Create a dissector handle associate with the player protocol and with
a routine to be called to dissect it*/
player_handle = create_dissector_handle(dissect_player, proto_player);
/*Associate the player_handle with a TCP port number so that the main
program will know to call us when TCP traffic arrives on that port*/
dissector_add_uint("tcp.port", PLAYER_PORT, player_handle);
}

####################################################################
## IPsec Configuration for Player Defense System
## John Hagen
## Masters in Cyber Operations AFIT/ENG AFRL/RYWC
####################################################################
############ Flush the SAD and SPD #################################
flush;
spdflush;
########## Security Associations AH SHA256-256 bit key #############
add 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 ah 0x200 -A hmac-sha256
0x8d375a74b4a2c70d36dc9c6de2179c4493f30034ef3c3682afb6be2b60bf42e9;
add 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.2 ah 0x300 -A hmac-sha256
0xb037b7c2a619fb0987bff4708eef2fb328c79aef1c26fddd46f2138a493c8708;
########## Security Associations ESP AES-256 bit key ###############
add 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.3 esp 0x201 -E aes-cbc
0x25ea0b76e21f20acab36da6642feb056fe98f14439b02db25091b13a5b85a75b;
add 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.2 esp 0x301 -E aes-cbc
0x5e3bebefdaea58e98433e7b7824e6950756012e81aadd38509c5fb5cc7c3bda5;
## To add authentication directly to ESP rather than use in conjunction with
AH add:
## -A hmac-sha256
## <SHA256 key>
########## Security Policies - AH Only #############################
## Require IPsec for all IP communication
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P out ipsec
##
ah/transport//require;
##
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P in ipsec
##
ah/transport//require;
########## Security Policies - ESP Only #############################
## Require IPsec for all IP communication
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P out ipsec
##
esp/transport//require;
##
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P in ipsec
##
esp/transport//require;
########## Security Policies - AH+ESP ###############################
## Require IPsec for all IP communication
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P out ipsec
##
esp/transport//require
##
ah/transport//require;
##
##spdadd 255.255.255.255/0 255.255.255.255/0 any -P in ipsec
##
esp/transport//require
##
ah/transport//require;
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DESCTUPTTON
''Cro,.>-pla.tti.mll robot device i11tcrhu:c "''d ~crvcr''
LICE::\SE = ''GPLv2+ anrl LGPLv2-''
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DEb'E.:\ US
''lihtool"
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STtC URI
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inherit pkgcon±ig

do configure () {
c111nkc -DC'.IAKE INSTALL PREFTX /u~r -DBUTLD EXA!vfPLES OTT -DBUTLD DOCU'.TENTATTO'\ OFFDDULD _EXA:'viPLES=<WF -DDUlLD _PLAYERCC=<WF -DDULD _PLAYERCC _DOOST=OFF.
-DDUILD PYTHONC DlNDl::\GS=<WF -DDULD SHARED - LlDS=OFF -DDUlLD - CTILS=OFF Dl3llLD - U'1LLS - LOCSb'UTTEil OFF -Dl3UlLD - lTLLS - PLAYEHCA:"vl OFF
-Dl3ULLD - UTLLS - b'LAYEJUOY OFF -Dl3ULD - UTLLS - PLAYEHNAV OFF -Dl3ULD - lTLLS - PLAYEHPIUNT OFb"
-Dl3ULLD - UTLLS - b'LAYEJWI!OP OFF -Dl3UlLD - UTLLS - b'LAYEHV CWF \
-DBUTLD CTTLS PTAYETtVCR OFF -DBUTLD UTTLS PLi\ YETtWTUTR\Tt\ P OFF -DBUTLD UTTLS Pl\fi\ P OFFDBCTLD CTTT.S XMI\fS OFF -DR'\i\BLR DTUVRTt ACCRL Ci\LTB OFF
-DE::\ADLE DRJVER - ACRJ20U=OFF -DENADLE DRIVER - ACTS=<WF -DENADLE DRIVER. AIOTOSONAR=<WF
-DE::\ADLE DRIVER ALSA=<WF -DENADLE DRlVER - AMCL=<WF
-DK\Al3LE - DIU VEil - AMTEC:"vlG OFF -DENAULE - DIUVEH - AMTECPO\VEI1Cll3E OFFDEJ\Al3LE - DHlVEH - AODV OFF -DE.:\Al3LE - DHlVEH - AHTOOLKLTPLUS OFFDENAilLE - DHlVEH - l3L0l3TODLO OFF'
-DE'\i\BLE DTUVETt BLOBTTtJ\CKER OFF -DENi\BLE DTUVETt BUMPER2Li\SETt OFFDENi\BLE DTUVF.H BUlVfPETtS t\FE OFF -DENi\BLE DTUVETt BUMPETtTODTO OFFDENADLE - DRiVER - CAMERAl:\!H=<WF
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Wagan Tech
+14V
Gnd
MTR72DAUL-1250A
AC to DC Converter
14VDC @ 5A

CUI INC
Battery +
Battery –
Battery – Charge

DB-25 Fem
Serial + (1)
Serial – (2)
Battery + (10)
Battery – (25)

iRobot Create 4400

DB-25 Male
(1) Serial +
(2) Serial –
(10) +15V
(25) Gnd

Ext Power
+5V
Gnd

Gumstix Overo Earth

USB
+/- 10V Diff Mode

Power Monitor
Dell Latitude E6510
Windows 7 SP1 64-bit
NI LabVIEW 9.0.1 32-bit

Note: Per the NI USB-6008 User
Guide, no AI channel can have
more than +10V applied to it.
AI Input Impedence: 144kΩ

+5V
Gnd EPS05100
Regulated
AC to DC Converter
5VDC @ 1A

R1: 0.1Ω
10W

+/- 1V Diff Mode

(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

GND
AI 0 (AI 0+)
AI 4 (AI 0-)
GND

USB

(5) AI 1 (AI 1+)
(6) AI 5 (AI 1-)
NI
(7) GND
USB-6008
(8) AI 2
(9) AI 6
(10) GND
(11) AI 3
(12) AI 7
(13) GND
(14) AO 0
(15) AO 1
(16) GND

P0.0 (17)
P0.1 (18)
P0.2 (19)
P0.3 (20)

DAQ

P0.4 (21)
P0.5 (22)
P0.6 (23)
P0.7 (24)
P1.0 (25)
P1.1 (26)
P1.2 (27)
P1.3 (28)
PFI 0 (29)
+2.5V (30)
+5V (31)
GND (32)

Appendix E: Lab VIEW Virtual Instrument for Power Monitor
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Appendix F: Data Tables
Factor Levcl1-1: Dcfense=Nonc; Exploit=Passive Sniffing
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Power
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%)
\V)

Packets Ket•vork Load
(packets) Bytes)

~ehvork

Load

(Kbps)

l

1

:1.462

2.114

3784

:1Fi572G

JEi.Ei726

2

1

:L1H

2.145

3790

:3FiG2GO

:35.G26

;)

1

:1.028

2.Hi0

3773

:3Fi4720

:3Fi.472

4

1

:3.267

2.145

3781

355478

35.5478

5

1

:1.2i'i6

2.147

3820

:1.l9080

:15.908

Factor Levels: Defense=Kone; Exploit=ARP Cache Poisoning
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ket>vor k Load ~ehvork Load
If packets) I3ytes)
Replication lrsuccesses l: Failure 0) %)
W)
Kbps)
1
1
:3.82"1
2.146
7469
705026
70.5026
2

1

•'3 .T"'
o't

2.152

74:38

701740

70.174

3

1

:3.205

2.144

7470

705092

70.i5092

4

1

:U16

2.H'l1

7406

699228

5

1

5.0."i.l

2.122

747:1

705622

69.9228
7(L":iG22

Factor Levels: Defense Kone: Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage A'.rerage Power Packets Kctwork Load ~etwork Load
lr packets) Bytes)
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) cy;:.,)
W)
Kbps)
1
1
96.296
2.:319 1:3617:3(
89874756
8987.4756
2.
:1F)0
9o:38:3,)10
1:3G94:3t
9o:38.:351
2
0
94.741
:3

1

97.007

2.:12:1

1:348911

89028798

8902.8798

4

1

94.829

91734298

9173.4298

5

95.408

2.350
2.321

138989£

1

136212Z

89900814

8990.0814

Factor Levels: Dcfeni-ic=Konc; Exploit=TCP Rc1-1ct
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ket\vork Load ~etwork Load
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%)
W)
(packets) Bytes)
(Kbps)
1
1
:1.o:39
2.12:1
17
1402
0.1402
2

1

2.149

15

1190

1

2.965
:3.132

2.157

25

21:30

0.119
0.213

:3
4

1

2.680

2.153

15

1190

0.119

5

1

2.711

2.158

15

1190

0.119

104

Factor Levels: Defense Kane: Exploit TCP Connection Flooding
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load
If packets) Bytes)
Kbps)
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.)
W)
41.42(
1
1
2.228
1:3702
1057i564
10i5.7564
2
1
:m.499
2.206
l:H9i5
1027288
102.7288
;)

4
5

1
1
1

40.406
40.471
38.990

2.2:34
2. 2:);)
2.211

13fiG6
13242
13369

104799G
1028818
1038380

104. 799G
102.8818
103.8:38

Factor Luvcls: Dcfcnse=lPscc AH; Exploit=Pa.ssive Sniffing
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage A'.rera.ge Power Packets Kctwork Load :.Jet work Load
W)
(packets) Bytes)
(Kbps)
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%)
;)800
1
1
:1.541
2.140
448400
44.84
2
1
:1.511
2.148
3791
447402
44.7402
1
:3.201
2.151
:3
3820
450760
45.076
2.149
44.613
4
1
:3.580
3781
446130
5

1

:3.145

2.120

:380i)

448955

44.895i5

Factor Levels: Defense=IPsec AH; Exploit=ARP Cache Poisoning
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%)
(vV)
(packets) (I3ytes)
(Kbps)
1
2.154
:3.961
48
4832
0.4832
0
44
2
2.794
2.123
4592
0.4592
0
3

4
5

0
0
0

2.765
2.805
:Ui'll

2.157
2.151
2.U),)

52
50
52

Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH: Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ketwor k
If packets) Bytes)
W)
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) cy;:. )
:3.5:32
2.14i5
i5487
1
0
2
0
:1.5:37
2.L~O
7ri88
:1
0
:1.702
2.116
7612
7.1)8;)
2.14;)
:1.:3,)8
4
0
2.147
:3.:375
7558
5
0

10,1)

5072
4952
;)072

O.i5072
0.4952
().;)072

Load

:.Jehvork Load
Kbps)
626951
62.6951
849844
84.9844
8.1)2648
8;).2648

849222

84.9222

846684

84.6684

Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH; Exploit TCP Reset
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load
If packets) Bytes)
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.)
W)
Kbps)
1
2.14i5
:3.296
82:3:3
7~l2986
79.2986
0
2
2.14i5
:3.:365
827i5
7~l7062
79.7062
0
;)

0

:1.269

2.14Ei

8186

788508

4

0

:LEifi

2.11:3

8212

79093G

78.8Fi08
79.09;)6

5

0

:3.:343

2.143

8240

79:3696

79.3696

Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH; Exploit TCP Connection Flooding
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage A'.rera.ge Power Packets Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load
If packets) Bytes)
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) !)(·.)
W)
Kbps)
10;3:38
8;39900
83.99
1
0
:3.571
2.119
2

0

:1.447

2.147

84.:3G6

0

:1.422

2.147

10:394
10:35i)

84:1660

:1

841:1Fi0

84.Ui'i

4

0

:1.584

2.L~O

10:322

8:39170

8:Un7

5

0

:3.755

2.118

103:33

838762

83.8762

Factor Levels: Dcfensc=lPsec ESP; Exploit=Passive Sniffing
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets Ket\vork Load :.Jet work Load
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%)
W)
(packets) Bytes)
(Kbps)
1
0
:1.5i'i2
2.161
:3782
491692
49.1692
2

0

:3.939

2.164

3770

490100

49.01

:3

0

:3.226

2.167

3785

491994

49.1994

4

0

:3.1:5;3

:3800

494000

49.4

5

0

:3.197

2.16i5
2.1;)8

:381i5

495622

49.i5622

Factor Levels: Defem:;e=IPsec ESP; Exploit=ARP Cache Poifloning
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets Ket>vor k Load :.Jehvork Load
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%)
(vV)
(packets) (I3ytes)
(Kbps)
1
2.166
5.75"1
983168
98.3168
0
7580
5.:39;3
2.167
7671
995126
99.i5126
2
0
3

0

:3.664

2.169

7557

980618

98.0618

4

0

4.024

2.1:34

7ri99

98G190

98.619

5

0

:3.865

2.171

7591

985054

98.i5054

10{)

Factor Levels: Defense IPsec ESP; Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets
Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load
If packets) Bytes)
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.)
W)
Kbps)
1
:3.271
2.169
4~)4186
:3801
49.4186
0
2

0

:3.221

2.170

:3778

4~l1020

49.102

;)

0

:1.447

2.1:37

3790

492700

49.27

4

0

:1.068

2.142

3820

49G600

49.G6

5

0

:3.068

2.138

3767

489718

48.9718

Factor Levels: Defense IPsec ESP; Exploit TCP Reset
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage A'.rera.ge Power Packets
Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load
If packets) Bytes)
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) !)(·.)
W)
Kbps)
1
0
:3.688
2.L39
:3791
492886
49.2886
2

0

:1.248

2.1:36

:3792

492992

49.2992

;)

0

:U87

2.1:38

:3777

491018

49.1018

4

0

:1.:316

2.140

:3771

49028G

49Jl286

5

0

4.143

2.139

3772

490392

49.0392

Factor Levels: Defcnse=lPscc ESP; Exploit=TCP Connection Flooding
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets
Ket\vork Load :.Jet work Load
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%)
W)
(packets) Bytes)
(Kbps)
1
0
:1.994
2.140
108:18
91G980
91.698
2

0

:3.562

2.138

106:33

901180

90.118

:3

0

:3.732

2.135

10704

908646

90.8646

4

0

4.84;1

2.168

10(19:3

9082:14

90.82:34

5

0

:3.70(

2.16i5

10691

905654

90.i5654

Factor Levels: Defense=IPsee AH+ESP; Exploit.=Pa...:;sive Sniffing
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets
K et>vor k Load :.Jehvork Load
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%)
(vV)
(packets) (13ytes)
(Kbps)
1
2.152
584692
58.4692
:3.670
0
3798
:3.92;1
2
0
2.124
:3802
i585i540
i58.554
:3

0

:3.9:35

2.154

:3777

i58Hi66

4

0

:Ui84

2.H'l6

:3801

i'i85410

58.Hi66
i'i8J)41

5

0

:3.701

2.15:3

:3806

i586156

58.6156
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Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH I ESP: Exploit ARP Cache Poisoning
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets
Ketvmrk Load :.Jehvork Load
If packets) Bytes)
Replication Succcsses=1: Failure=O) <;.{.)
W)
Kbps)
1
2.12:3
:3.874
7544
1159768
11i5.9768
0
2
4.1:38
2.152
761:3
1170188
117.0188
0
;)

0

:1.937

2.Hi:1

7fi84

1Hl5800

116.58

4

0

4.087

2.127

7fi88

11t161GO

llG.G16

5

0

4.280

2.125

7569

116:3418

116.3418

Factor Levels: Defense IPsec AH I ESP; Exploit TCP Connection Hijacking
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage A'.rera.ge Power Packets
Ketwork Load :.Jet work Load
If packets) Bytes)
Replication 11 Succcsses=1; Failure=O) !)(·.)
W)
Kbps)
1
0
4.1:35
2.15i5
:3811
i586950
i58.69i5
2
:3
4

0

4.1:32

2.149

:HG1

i'i79170

i'i7.917

0

2.Hi0

:3801

i'i85410

i'i8Ji41

0

4.1:32
:1.86(

2.L~1

:3801

i'i85410

i'i8Ji41

5

0

:3.972

2.151

3791

583870

58.387

Factor Levels: Dcfensc=lPsec AH-ESP; Exploit=TCP Reset
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Power Packets
Ket\vork Load :.Jet work Load
Replication lrsuccesses=1; Failure=O) (%)
W)
(packets) Bytes)
(Kbps)
1
0
:1.7:32
2.119
:3781
i'i82:3:30
i'i8.2:t3
2

0

4.:311

2.149

:3

0

:3.756

4

0

5

0

580790

58.079

2.153

3771
3762

579380

57.938

:3.6:3(

2.15:3

:3796

i584i584

58.4584

:3.878

2.147

:3786

i58:3044

58.:3044

Factor Levels: Defense=IPsec AH-ESP; Exploit=TCP Connection Flooding
Exploit Outcome
Average CPU Usage Average Pmver Packets
K et>vor k Load :.Jehvork Load
Replication (Successes 1: Failure 0) (%)
(vV)
(packets) (I3ytes)
(Kbps)
1
4.143
2.127
10241
96.9539
0
969539
2
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